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THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM
DONALD J. CANTOR
The author is a member of the bar of Connecticut, with law offices in Hartford. He is a graduate of
Harvard College as well as the Harvard Law School.
In the first portion of this article, Mr. Cantor comprehensively analyze the legal efforts which
have been made, both in this country and on the international level, to combat the trade in illicit
narcotics. These efforts, he believes, have been largely ineffective and are, for a number of reasons
which he details, doomed to continuing failure. In concluding, Mr. Cantor calls for a comprehensive
interdisciplinary attack on the problem and, in that connection, he sets forth definitive suggestions
concerning the important role which the criminal law may be able to play in the socio-medical plan
which is eventually developed.-EDrroR.
INTRODUCTION
The problem posed by the illicit traffic in nar-
cotics,' surely as much as any other contemporary
social evil, has generated great controversy. This
controversy has arisen largely from differing views
of the role the criminal law should play in ridding
the United States of the evils this traffic causes.
Both sides to this controversy usually agree that
when the criminal law can serve a rehabilitative
function it should be so utilized. But for several
reasons-primarily cost and the lack of a cure for
opiate addiction-the law is not, save in a few
largely unsuccessful instances, used as a rehabili-
tative agent. Mainly it exists to deter, and it is
around its capacity to deter and eventually eradi-
cate the illicit trade in narcotics that the argument
swirls.
One side argues that the solution lies, at least
in the first instance, in imposing severe penalties
for violation of both federal and state criminal
narcotics statutes. This is the pronounced, often-
repeated view of the Commissioner of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.2 The same view was reflected
I The term "narcotics" as used herein includes all
derivatives, preparations and mixtures of opium; co-
caine and any derivative, preparation and mixture of
coca leaves, except derivatives which do not contain
cocaine, ecgonine, or substance from which either may
be made; marihuana and any other parts of the canna-
bis sativa plant, by whatever name known, and every
compound, derivative or preparation thereof, excluding
the mature stalks or any fibers produced therefrom, or
any product of the seeds of the plant; and any synthet-
ics with properties similar to opium, coca leaves and/or
marihuana or their derivatives. The term "narcotics"
does not include barbituates, amphetamines, deriva-
tives or extracts of peyote or any other drug not ex-
pressly described above.2
ANSLINGER & ToMPxINs, THE TRAFFIC IN NAR-
concs 295-97 (1953); FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOT-
Ics, RELEASE ON THE FEDERAL NARCOTICS LAWS (Octo-
ber, 1956).
in both the 1956 report of the Subcommittee on
Narcotics to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee,3 and the resulting Narcotics Control Act of
1956,4 which increased the penalties for violations
of federal narcotics laws.
The opposition, while at odds on its proposed
solutions, nevertheless unites in condemning this
punitive approach and in stressing that the
narcotics problem is essentially and primarily a
medical one, necessarily requiring some form of
legal dispensation of narcotics for its solution.-
It has been claimed that the punitive approach
has proved itself "totally ineffective"' and that
it lacks the capacity to deter either the non-
addicted dealer in narcotics or the addicted user.
7
Moreover, it has been asserted that the very
existence of such punitive laws creates an illegal
business in narcotics which, in its own interest,
inveigles new customers into addiction, and that,
therefore, the so-called deterrence laws in fact
encourage the very menace they were designed to
obliterate.8
The purpose of this paper is to determine the
extent to which punitive legislation can act as an
effective deterrent in eradicating the trade in
3 House Subcommittee on Narcotics, Report on the
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics (84th Cong., 2d Sess., Comm.
Print., 1956).
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7237. This is described
in more detail in the text, infra, under the heading
"American Narcotics Laws (Federal)."
5NARcoTics, U.S.A. 231-44 (Weston ed. 1952);
LINDESMITH, OPIATE ADDICTION 204-10 (1947); BARNES
& TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 88-89
(2d ed. 1951); NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE,
REPORT ON DRUG ADDICTION 12 (1955).
6 NARCOTIcs, U.S.A. 234 (Weston ed. 1952).7 NEW YoRK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, REPORT ON
DRUG ADnCTION 10 (1955).
8 
VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 117-
18 (1936).
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illicit narcotics. The first step is to examine the
efforts-international and American-which have
been made to combat this trade.
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS
If any one adjective aptly describes the nature
of the narcotics problem, it is "international," and
this is especially so in relation to the United States,
for in the narcotics trade the United States is
almost completely a consumer nation.
The poppy, from which opium9 comes, requires'
a particular type of soil and a special climate. To
flourish, it must have both a very wet and hot
climate and a subsequent hot and dry climate.
Thus areas of India, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugo-
slavia, and China are the prime producers of raw
opium; however, Mexico, Bulgaria, Southeast
Asia, North Africa, Pakistan, and the U.S.S.R. are
also large producing areas.10
Cocaine, obtained from the coca leaf, is an
extract which comes from Peru, Bolivia, and
Indonesia (Java in particular) where the coca leaf
is indigenous."
Marihuana is more widespread and can be grown
in the United States. 12 Today it is found either
growing wild or under cultivation in India, Burma,
Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Greece, Brazil, Mexico,
Africa, the United States, and to small degree in
Western Europe.
3
Moreover, the nations in which the narcotics are
processed are often neither the producing nor the
consuming nations. Also, nations which are neither
producer, processor nor purchaser may serve as
smuggling conduits.
The history and description of international
attempts to combat the narcotics trade are omitted
here because of their detailed exposition in a
previous article' 4 For our purloses it is enough
to point out that no convention or protocol ever
adopted has numbered among its signers all those
nations whose support is essential to making such
agreements effective. Naturally, Communist China
9 "Opium" when used herein, refers not only to opium
itself, but to all its addictive derivatives, especially
morphine and diacetylmorphine (heroin).
10 WILLOUGHBY, OPIUM AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROB-
IEM 1 (1925); ANSLINGER & TomrIcNs, TAE TRArric
IN NARconcs 210-11 (map) (1953).
1 WIL.OUGHBY, OPIUMi AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROB-
LEM 2 (1925).
12 This is, of course, illegal. INT. , v. CODE OF 1954,
§4741-4786.
"3 ANSLINGER & TompxiNs, TnE TRAP "Ic IN NAR-
conTcs 18 (1953).
14 Aisixy, International Efforts to Control Narcotics,
50 J. CRim. L., C.&P.S. 105 (1959).
is a signatory to none of them. In addition, India,
Iran, Malaya, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R., Mexico,
Boliva, Peru, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Bulgaria-of
the important nations in this area-have all, on
at least one occasion, refused to sign.' 5 And when,
in 1950, representatives of the drug-manufacturing
nations and the principal opium-producing nations
met to consider setting the price at which opium
should sell and to discuss the need for international
inspection to ensure compliance with price and
quota restrictions, again effective agreement was
not forthcoming. The agreement which resulted-
The Opium Protocol of 23 June 1953-did not
restrict prices, nor did it create any inspection
system to oversee compliance with any of the
idealistic terms agreed to.
AMERIcAN NARcOTIcs LAWS
Federal Laws
The principal narcotics laws which are designed
to halt the illicit trade in narcotics are:
1. The Harrison Narcotic Law, now incorpo-
rated in the Internal Revenue Code; 16
2. The Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act,
as amended;"
3. The Marihuana Tax Act, also part of the
Internal Revenue Code;as and
4. The Narcotic Control Act of 1956. 9
The Harrison Act, passed in 1914, was America's
attempt to implement obligations incurred by
signing The Hague Convention of 1912. As is
evident by its inclusion in the Internal Revenue
Act, this laws was enacted pursuant to Congress's
power to tax. However transparent this pretext
may be, and however valid may seem the con-
tention that Congress was in reality masking an
unconstitutional police measure in taxation clothes,
nonetheless the act has been upheld as a revenue
measure, and the question of its constitutionality
may be deemed closed.0
The Harrison Act imposes a tax upon "narcotic
drugs, produced in or imported into the United
States, and sold, or removed for consumption or
sale."" Some preparations are exempted if their
"5 U.N. Doc. No. E/CN 7/335/add. 3 (1958).
16 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §W701-4736.
17 Jones-Miller Act, 42 Stat. 596 (1922), 21 U.S.C.
§§171-185 (1952).
"S INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§4741-4786.
"s Ibid., §§7237-7238.
20 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394
(1916); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919);
Nigro v. U.S., 276 U.S. 332 (1928).
21 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §4701.
DONALD J. CANTOR
narcotic content is below a prescribed minimum.n
It is made unlawful under section 4704 for any
person to "purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute
narcotic drugs except in the original stamped
package," and doing so without such stamps is
made prima facie evidence of the violation of
section 4704 by the person in whose possession the
unstamped narcotic drugs are found. This pre-
sumption has been held to be constitutional.n
The act requires annual registration of every
importer, manufacturer, producer, wholesale
dealer, retail dealer, physician, dentist, veterinary
surgeon, other practitioner, researcher, analyst,
instructor, or, if not one of the above, one who
nevertheless dispenses remedies or preparatives of
limited narcotic content. Moreover all fitting this
description must pay an "occupational tax"
ranging from S1.00 to $24.00 per year.24 Once
again a presumption is raised; this time it pertains
to possession of any original stamped package by
one who has not registered and paid the appropri-
ate tax, and this presumption decrees that such
possession "shall be prima facie evidence of liability
to such special tax."2 5 This has also been upheld.2 6
Section 4705 makes mandatory the use of special
order forms whenever narcotic drugs are sold,
bartered, exchanged or given away, and it requires
further that any physician, dentist, veterinary
surgeon or other practitioner keep records of any
drugs handled.
Of especial significance for the narcotic addict2
is the wording of sections 4704a, 4705, and 4724.
Section 4704a provides in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase,
sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs except
in the original stamped package or from the
original stamped package.... The provisions of
subsection a. shall not apply ... to any person
having in his or her possession any narcotic
drugs ... which have been... issued for legiti-
mate medical uses by a physician....
- Ibid., §4702.
2 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928); Mu-
laney v. U.S., 82 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1936).24 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§4721, 4722.
5 Ibid., §4723.
26James v. United States, 279 Fed. 111 (5th Cir.
1922).
27"Addict" as used herein-until specifically
changed-denotes only a repeated user of any narcotic;
it does not distinguish between those psychologically
and physiologically dependent upon regular dosages of
opium or any opiate extract or synthetic, on the one
hand, and those who merely use some narcotic or have
to some extent become psychologically dependent on
one, on the other hand.
Section 4705 reads similarly:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to sell,
barter, exchange or give away narcotic drugs
except in pursuance of a written order of the
person to whom such article is sold, bartered,
exchanged, or given. . . . Nothing contained in
this section shall apply.., to the dispensing of
or distribution of narcotic drugs to a patient by
a physician ... in the course of his professional
practice only.... "
And in section 4724c we find:
"It shall be unlawful for any person who has
not registered and paid the special tax provided
for by this subpart ... to have in his possession
or under his control narcotic drugs .... Pro-
vided, that this subsection shall not apply... to
the possession of narcotic drugs which ... have
been prescribed in good faith by a physician .... "
Section 4724a, moreover, utilizes the phrase
"for legitimate medical uses" employed also in
section 4704a.
When the Harrison Act was first passed, phrases
such as "legitimate medical purposes," "pro-
fessional practice" and "prescribed in good faith"
were interpreted, not unreasonably, by some
physicians to mean that addiction could be re-
garded as a disease, and that the addict, as a
patient, could be prescribed narcotics to alleviate
the horrors of withdrawal, i.e., that period of
intense illness and pain which results from the
discontinuance of the regular opiate dosages upon
which the user has become both psychologically
and physically dependent. However, this is not
the legal interpretation which has attached to these
phrases. The Treasury Department interpreted
the Harrison Act to label unlawful any medical
prescription for an addict for the purpose of
satisfying the defnands of the addiction itself.3
This construction has been approved by the
courts.2 Thus, as a result of the Harrison Act as
interpreted, the addict must go to illegal sources
to obtain his narcotics.
In 1922, Congress passed the Jones-Miller Act,
officially known as the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act. Its constitutionality has been up-
held.30
2
8 Treas. Reg. No. 5, Art. 167 (1957); Treas. Dec. No.
2809 (20 March 1919).
2 9 Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189
(1920); Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir.
1941); United States v. Keidanz, 270 Fed. 585 (S.D.
N.Y. 1921).
- Yee Hen v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925);
Gee Woe v. United States, 250 Fed. 428 (5th Cir. 1918).
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This act prohibited the importation of any
narcotic not specifically found necessary for medi-
cal and scientific needs, 31 banned the importation
of crude opium for the purpose of making heroin, 2
restricted the importation of coca leaves13 and
marihuanaO and prohibited the exportation of
narcotic drugs.35 Like the Harrison Act, the Jones-
Miller Act created presumptions. Section 174
provides:
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this sub-
section the defendant is shown to have or have
had possession of the narcotic drug, such pos-
session shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction unless the defendant ex-
plains the possession to the satisfaction of the
jury."
This presumption frees the government from
having to show the possessed narcotics were in fact
unlawfully imported and that the defendant knew
this.38 Such presumptions run throughout the act.7
The penalties for violating the importation re-
strictions on narcotic drugs are, for a first offense,
imprisonment for not less than five nor more than
twenty years, and in addition, a fine not exceeding
$20,000. For a second or subsequent offense the
minimum is ten years, the maximum forty years,
and the additional fine may be, as before, $20,000. 38
Like penalties attach for the unlawful importation
of marihuana.P Stricter penalties are provided,
though, in the case of one, himself over eighteen
years of age, who
"knowingly sells, gives away, furnishes, or dis-
penses, facilitates the sale, giving, furnishing, or
dispensing, or conspires to sell, give away,
furnish, or dispense any heroin unlawfully im-
ported or otherwise brought into the U.S., to any
person who has not attained the age to eighteen
years."
Such a person may be fined not more than $20,000
and may be imprisoned not less than ten years as
a minimum, with life the maximum, except that
should the jury direct the defendant may receive
the death penalty.40 It is here worthy of note that





35 Frank v. United States, 37 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1929);
United States v. Moe Liss, 105 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1939).
37 Jones-Miller Act, op. cit. supra note 17, §§176a,
176b, 178, 179, & 181.
38 Ibd., §174.
39 bid., §176a.40 Ibid., 176b.
the section above described has, besides the alterna-
tive death penalty, a presumption of unlawful im-
portation which arises when heroin is found in
the defendant's possession.
The third important federal anti-narcotics law
is the Marihuana Tax Act, passed in 1937, and
now part of the Internal Revenue Code.4' This act
is, in basic structure, patterned after the Harrison
Act. The Marihuana Tax Act places a transfer tax
on all transfers of marihuana,42 prescribes order
forms,41 makes unauthorized possession unlawful
and makes possession presumptive evidence of
guilt,M imposes an occupational tax,15 and requires
registration 46 and returns.4 Just as happened with
the Harrison Act, the Marihuana Tax Act was
attacked as an unconstitutional attempt by
Congress to regulate a trade beyond its scope by
means of a tax facade; this attack was also un-
successful. 4
The fourth basic federal anti-narcotic legislation,
effective as of July 19, 1956, is known as the
Narcotic Control Act of 1956.49 This act prescribes
penalties for all violations of the Harrison Act and
the Marihuana Tax Act for which those acts do
not themselves provide specific penalties. The act
treats violations of the laws relating to opium,
coca leaves and marihuana and does not differ-
entiate between them. The penalties provided by
the act are:
1. Generally
a. Not less than two years or more than ten
years imprisonment. Fine of not over
$20,000 is optional.
b. For a second offense, not less than five
years or more than twenty years imprison-
ment. Fine of not more than S20,000 is
optional.
c. For a third or subsequent offense, the
offender may get not less than ten or more
than forty years in prison and, in addition,
may also be fined $20,000.
2. For selling, bartering, exchanging, giving away
or transferring any narcotic drug or marihuana
to a person under eighteen (if the offender is







4s United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
49 INT. Rxv. CoDE oF 1954, §7237.
o Ibid., §7237a.
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himself over eighteen), the mandatory sentence
is not less than ten or more than forty years
imprisonment plus the optional $20,000 fine.5'
The act also provides, inter alia, that upon con-
viction for a second or subsequent offense, the
penalty for which falls under section 7237a, or
upon conviction of any offense the penalty for
which falls under section 7237b, or under several
sections of the Jones-Miller Act and/or the Act of
July 11, 194152 neither suspended sentences nor
probation may be granted."
To enforce these laws the federal government
created the Bureau of Narcotics, a subdivision of
the Treasury Department, in 1930. Its average
budget is somewhat less than $2 million per
annum, and it maintains a force of 250 agents, 25
less than Congress has authorized. The sole re-
sponsibility for preventing smuggling rests with
the Bureau of Customs. In the view of the Con-
gressional Subcommittee on Narcotics, both of
these bureaus suffer from a shortage of manpower.Y
State Laws
The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, with slight
modifications, is law in forty-six states, Puerto
Rico, and the District of Columbia.5 5 Thus only
four states have adopted their own basic anti-
narcotic legislation. These are California, Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire. The
state narcotics laws of California and Pennsylvania
have been approved by Commissioner Anslinger
51 Ibid., §7237b.
52 The act of July 11, 1941, as amended, is incor-
porated into the Federal Code as section 184a of title 21.
It prescribes penalties for persons found in illegal pos-
session of narcotics on a vessel of the United States.
Other federal laws relevant to this topic not described
in this paper are:
1. The Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942 (21 U.S.C.
188-188n), barring the cultivation of the opium
poppy in the United States;
2. The Act of August 9, 1939, as amended August 9,
1950 (49 U.S.C. 781-788), allowing the United States
to seize vessels, vehicles, etc. used to transport con-
traband narcotics;
3. The Act of July 3, 1930 (21 U.S.C. 199), empower-
ing the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics to pay informers, and
4. The Act of January 18, 1929 (42 U.S.C. 257),
establishing Public Health Service Hospitals for ad-
dicts in Lexington, Ky. and Fort Worth, Texas.
The famous Boggs Act, passed in 1951 (Public Law 255,
82nd Congress), has been superseded by the Narcotic
Control Act of 1956, op. cit. supra note 19.
5 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, §7237d.
5 House Subcommittee on Narcotics, Report on the
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, 11, 12 (84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Comm. Print. 1956).559(B) U.L.A. 274.
of the Bureau of Narcotics as being of "comparable
efficacy" to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,
56
the negative implication being that, from the
point of view of enforcement, only the laws of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire fall short of
the standards set up by the advocates of the
punitive approach. This was echoed by the 1956
report of the House Subcommittee on Narcotics
when it stated in part:
"The last annual report of the Government of
the United States on Traffic in Opium and
Other Dangerous Drugs to the International
Drug Convention indicates that the States of
Kansas, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts
do not have adequate narcotic legislation. "57
The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act provides, in
its most important sections, as follows:
1. Section 2 makes it unlawful for any person
to manufacture, possess, have under his control,
sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or com-
pound any narcotic drug, except as authorized
in this act.
2. Section 4 makes possession of narcotic drugs,
obtained as authorized, lawful only if "in the
regular course of business, occupation, profes-
sion, employment or duty of the possessor."
3. Section 5 allows, inter alia, a physician to
administer drugs only "within the scope of his
employment or official duty, and then only for
scientific or medicinal purposes."
4. Section 7 allows a physician to administer
drugs "in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only."
5. Sections 9 & 10 require records to be kept
and labels to be affixed to packages.
6. Section 11 defines authorized possession of
narcotic drugs by an individual as capable of
existing only if the individual has received same
pursuant to an authorized prescription or sale
for dispensation as defined under section 5.
Thus, as in the federal narcotics laws, possession
per se is unlawful unless obtained in certain
exempted ways and from certain authorized
personnel. The usual prescriber, of course, is a
physician, and the legality of his prescriptions
rests, as in the Harrison and Marihuana Tax
5
6 ANSLINGER & Tosmwics, THE TRAFFIC IN NAR-
COTICS 154 (1953).
57 House Subcommittee Report, op. cit. supra note
54, at 10, 11. This report was written before Kansas
adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in 1957.
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Acts, upon the definitions awarded to such phrases
as "within the scope of his . . . official duty,"
"for scientific and medical purposes," and "in good
faith and in the course of his professional practice
only." Though very few cases have arisen which
interpret these phrases, it seems clear that the
Uniform State Narcotic Acts will be so interpreted
as to make unlawful prescriptions to an addict
for the purpose of treating his addiction.-" The
similarity between the Uniform Act and the
Harrison and Marihuana Tax Acts, and the general
intention of the states to complement federal
enforcement activities in this field dictate this
conclusion. Such an intent is in fact expressed
in codified form in the Uniform Act.59
Section 20 is the penalty section. In the Model
Act this is left blank, each state providing its
own. The disparity among the penalties imposed
is rather striking, especially when one considers
the fact that this is, after all, a "uniform" act.
The form of section 20 which appears most often,
though not always the same in all details, is the
one presently used in Maryland. 60 It prescribes
increasing sentences for second, third and sub-
sequent offenses. The first offense is punishable
by not less than two or more than five years, the
second by not less than five years or more than
ten years, and the third or any subsequent offense
by not less than ten or more than twenty years.
A schedule of graduated fines is also included.
Some of the Uniform Acts include life imprison-
ment,61 and a lesser number make death a possible
penalty should the jury so recommend. 4 The
56 Tonis v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 286, 67 N.E.
2d 245 (1946); McKay v. State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, 103 Colo. 305, 86 P.2d 232 (1938); Smith v.
State, 214 Ind. 169, 13 N.E.2d 562 (1938); People v.
Guagliata, 362 Ill. 427, 200 N.E. 169 (1936).
59 UNiou NARcoic DRUG AcT, §19.
'0 MD. ANN. CODE, §300 (1957). For comparable
penalty provisions, see also the applicable code sections
of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
6y Indiana, for instance, prescribes life imprisonment
as the maximum sentence for a third offender, the mini-
mum being 20 years. IND. STAT. ANN. §10-3538a (1957
Cum. Supp.). This is the usual way in-which life im-
prisonment is used. Connecticut, however, prescribes
life imprisonment as the mandatory sentence for a
third offense. CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. §19-265 (1955
Supp.). This mandatory sentence attaches to a third
offense violative of any provision of the Uniform Act.
2 Mo. STAT. ANN. §195-200 (1958 Cum. Pocket
Part); Okla. Stat. Ann., titles 63-67 §420 (1958 Cum.
Pocket Part); TEXAS PENAL CODE §23(2) (1958 Cum.
Pocket Part).
death penalty is provided only for violations
involving minors, though the age definition for
minors differs among the states.63
By way of contrast, some jurisdictions not only
do not provide for either life imprisonment or
the discretionary death penalty, but make one
year the maximum penalty for a first offender.6
In Montana, the maximum sentence for a first
offense for violation of any provision of the
Uniform Act is imprisonment in the county jail
for a term not exceeding six months and a fine
not exceeding $1000. But life imprisonment is
possible if the offender sells, etc., drugs to one
under eighteen years of age.65
Other sections of the Uniform Act relate to
the act's deterrent machinery. Section 21 provides
that
"No person shall be prosecuted for a violation
of any provision of this act if such person has
been acquitted or convicted under the Federal
Narcotic Laws of the same act or omission which
it is alleged, constitutes a violation of this
act."66
Though this will not bar a subsequent state
prosecution on constitutional grounds of double
jeopardy,6" it nonetheless, by its existence, fore-
stalls such prosecutions.64 Section 18 puts the
burden of proof of any exception, excuse, proviso,
or exemption contained in the Uniform Act upon
the defendant. This has been held not to violate
the Federal Constitution."4
Many states have added other weapons to their
enforcement arsenal by adding to the penalty
section of the Uniform Act sections which provide
that prior narcotics convictions of federal or
state laws will qualify as prior offenses for the
purposes of interpreting their statutes,70 and that
the normal state laws permitting suspended sen-
3 Missouri-under 21; Oklahoma-under 18; Texas
-under 19.64 D.C. CODE §33423; KAN. GEN. STAT. §65-2519
(1957 Supp.); In Arizona the judge may in his discre-
tion, for a first offense, impose a sentence of one year
in the county jail with or without a fine. But it is dis-
cretionary and a higher penalty for a first offense is
permissible. ARIz. REv. STAT. §36-1020; State v. Ben-
ton, 78 Ariz. 85, 276 P.2d 516 (1955).61 MONT. REV. CODE §54-125.
61 UNIFO.m NARCOTIC DRUG AcT, §21.
6
7People ex rel. Liss v. Superintendent of Women's
Prison, 282 N.Y. 115 25 N.E. 2d 869 (1940).
68 State v. Worthham, 63 Ariz. 148, 160 P.2d 352
(1945).
69 State v. Jourdain, 225 La. 1030, 74 So.2d 203
(1954).
,0 An example of this map can be found in Virginia.
VA. CODE ANN., §1385(23).
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tences, probation and parole will not be allowed
to pertain to narcotics offenses.;
New York, though one of the states that has
adopted the Uniform Act, merits specific examina-
tion due to its status as the state with the gravest
narcotics problem. Its penalty sections provide
for imprisonment for from seven to fifteen years
for selling, etc., narcotic drugs to one under
twenty-one, and from five to fifteen years if no
minor is involved. "Possession" offenses also
range from five to fifteen years imprisonment.
These penalties are all for first offenses.72 New York
provides, as a special addition to its section 1941
on second or third felony offenses, that the third
narcotic offense shall incur imprisonment of from
fifteen years to life. A second offense is punishable,
as are all second felony convictions in New York,
by a minimum sentence equal to one-half the
longest term provided for the first conviction and
a maximum sentence not longer than twice the
longest term provided for the first conviction.
Translated, this means that conviction of a second
narcotics offence in New York carries a minimum
sentence of seven and one-half years and a maxi-
mum sentence of thirty years. 3
A novel type of presumption is contained in
the New York version of the Uniform Act. It is
a presumption of intent to sell, etc., a narcotic
drug which arises if the defendant was found to
possess certain specific quantities of unlawful
narcotics.74
This leaves the few states which have not
adopted the Uniform Act. California and Penn-
sylvania, the two states without the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act whose narcotics laws were
deemed adequate by Commissioner Anslinger,75
have statutes largely similar in their basic at-
tributes to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. The
penalties provided for violations of the California
and Pennsylvania acts are also similar, with both
states, especially Pennsylvania, included within
71 Usually, such provisions bar suspended sentences,
probation and parole until the minimum sentence has
been served. Often this is true of all offenders save
first offenders. Ind. Stat. Ann., §10-3538c (1957 Cum.
Supp).
72 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS AxmN., bk. 39, §§1751 (1) &(2).
lbid., §§1941(1) & (2).7 4 bid., §1751(3). This same presumption exists in
section 1751(4) as to all persons found in an automo-
bile wherein such quantities of. narcotics are found.
Virginia provides not for presumptions based on quan-
tity, but rather for a stiffer sentence when narcotics in
excess of specific quantities are found in defendant's
possession. VA. CODE, §54-516.
75 See notes 56 and 57, supra.
that group of states which imposes the severest
penalties.
76
The two states which did not, in Mr. Anslinger's
view, have adequate anti-narcotics laws were
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Since the
time when these states were criticized, both have
altered their statutes, though to differing degrees.
It would be proper to say of Massachusetts that
it has had, since January 1, 1958, an utterly new
law. Because of the strong resemblance of the
new law to the Uniform Act in all major aspects
of narcotic regulation, and particularly because its
penalties, though not including death or life
imprisonment, are stiffer than the bulk of the
states, it is believed that Commissioner Anslinger
would approve of and deem adequate the present
Massachusetts statute, As to New Hampshire,
though its narcotics law covers fewer aspects of
the narcotics problem than the laws of the other
other forty-eight states, and though it has a much
narrower regulatory scope, nonetheless it prohibits
unauthorized possession, sale, prescription, etc.,
of all the narcotic drugs under federal control and
provides that violation of the law shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one year and a
day nor more than ten years. 8 As of July 5, 1955,
any violation of section 318.49 involving an intent
by defendant to provide narcotic drugs to a minor,
or actually doing so, is punished by from three
to ten years for a first conviction, from five to
fifteen years for a second conviction, and from
fifteen to thirty years for a third conviction29
This survey of state penal legislation would be
incomplete without briefly mentioning three other
mechanisms by which state control over narcotics
violations is exercised. First, some states specifi-
cally label addiction a crime.80 Second, some states
provide for the commitment of an addict to an
76 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§11712, 11713,
11714, 11715, 11715.6, 11715.7 and 11716. Note that
life imprisonment is possible under section 11713. As
to Pennsylvania, life imprisonment is the sole and
mandatory penalty for third offenses and no sus-
pended sentences, probation or parole may be granted.
PA. STAT. AN N., tit. 35, §865.
"MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§197-217D. Though
Massachusetts does not prescribe life imprisonment as
such, it does prescribe maximum sentences of 25 years
(§212A), 30 years (§217C), 40 (§217B), and 50 years
(§217A) for different violations.7 8N. HAMP. REV. STAT. AN.., §318:49-2 (1957
Supp.).
79 Ibid., §318:49-2 (1957 Supp.).
60 An example of this is Colorado where an addict is
deemed a "disorderly person" and as such may be con-
fined in the county jail or state penitentiary for six
months to one year. CoLo. REv. STAT., §48-6-20 (4)
(1957 Supp.).
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institution or hospital equipped to treat addiction
medically." And third, in some states, munici-
palities have adopted ordinances to combat local
problems.TM
In resume, the laws of our federal and state
governments are strong ones, not only imposing
stringent penalties upon those found guilty of
infringement, but also utilizing means which are
unusual in the criminal law--such as presump-
tions against the accused and restrictions on
suspended sentences, probation and parole-in
order to provide as much deterrent force as the
ingenuity of legal minds and the relevant con-
stitutions will permit. Moreover, those who cham-
pion the punitive, deterrent approach to the
problem of illicit narcotics consider these laws,
with the exception of those in force now in New
Hampshire, as adequate to serve their deterrent
function.
Before the ability of these federal and state
laws, operating along with international controls,
to deter the illicit narcotic traffic can be examined,
the boundaries of the present problem must be
delineated. Only in this way can the past effec-
tiveness of such penal legislation be estimated and
the future problems facing such legislation be
appraised.
THE PRESENT PROBLEWE
The extent of the illicit traffic, whether measured
in terms of monetary value, number of addicts, or
amount of narcotics, is, unfortunately, impossible
to establish with precision. This imprecision
typifies the narcotics problem, filled as it is with
a plethora of statistical, medico-chemical, and
psychiatric unknowns. This lack of certainty
makes contradiction of assertions difficult, and
the partisan can therefore underestimate or over-
estimate, as his interest desires, with an impunity
unavailable in other fields.
The starting point in such an evaluation as
s1 N.Y. CONSOL. LAws A-,.., bk. 44, §3341. This is
done in the discretion of the presiding magistrate.
62 AsLuNGER, Narcotic Addiction as Seen by the Law-
Enforcement Officer, 21 Fed. Prob. 22 (No. 2, 1957).
These three factors have been touched upon summarily
because, due to the much harsher penalties imposed by
federal and other state laws, their importance as de-
terrents is negligible. It must be recalled that all persons
-whether or not dependent upon regular dosages of an
opiate-are equally vulnerable to the penalties inflicted
for unlawful possession or sale of narcotics. Thus these
penalties, having greater punitive force than the "dis-
orderly persons" or commitment laws, are the ones by
which the deterrent potency of "the law" as an entity
must be measured.
this should logically be the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics. This Bureau has estimated, as of 1956,
that some 60,000 addicts exist in the United States.
This number purportedly represents a decrease of
about 190,000 from the number of addicts existent
prior to passage of the Harrison Narcotic Act in
1914, and a decrease from 1952, when the peak
was reached in the postwar upsurge in addiction s3
Presumably this figure of 60,000 addicts includes
not only those whose use of opiates and opiate-
synthethics has resulted in both physical and
psychological dependence upon continued dosages,
but also users of other narcotics, most particularly
cocaine and marihuana (and their derivatives and
synthetics), as this is how "addiction" is defined
in Commissioner Anslinger's book.'" So viewed,
the estimate of 60,000 is quite low as compared
with other estimates.
The Mayor's Committee on Narcotics estimated
that, in 1951, New York City alone contained
between 45,000 and 90,000 drug users.85 Oursl er
and Smith refer to the Narcotics Bureau estimate
of 60,000 as "conservative" and go on to say,
"Other estimates vary between one hundred and
two hundred thousand. But the figure could be
even higher."86
Another view is that "various present-day
estimates of illicit users range from 100,000 to 4
million.... Less than one million might be a closer
guess."' s
It has been stated, this time by a police official-
Lieutenant Walter of the Narcotics Division of
the Los Angeles Police Department-that over
53,000 heroin addicts alone existed in the United
States in 1951.M This figure does not include
addiction to any other derivative of opium, opium
itself or any synthetic opiate; nor does it include
users of marihuana or cocaine. This figure may
not include all those who used heroin either,
depending upon how Lt. Walter defined "addicts."
If only 20 percent of all addicts use heroin, as
was true in the group tested by D. P. Wilson,s9
then the 60,000 figure is only about 25 percent of
83 House Subcommittee on Narcotics, Report on the
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics 8, 9 (84th Cong., 2d Sess.
Comm. Print., 1956).
4 
ANSLINGER & TomiKNs, THE TRAFFIC IN NAR-
COTics 242, 243 (1953).
85 STEVENS, Make Dope Legal, Harpers Magazine
42, 43 (Nov. 1952).
86 OURSLER & SMITH, NARCOTIcs: Asmuc.A's PERIL
42 (1952).
87 WHSON, My Six CoNvicts 330 (1951).8s LEONG, NARcOTICS-THE MENACE TO CHILDREN
23, 24 (1952).
s9 WiLsox, op. cit. supra note 87, at 336.
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the true total. And even if heroin is "the most
popular drug with addicts in this country" as
Commissioner Anslinger maintains, probably
correctly, 90 still the 60,000 estimate is probably
highly incompatible with Lt. Walter's 53,000
figure, even though the latter number is as of 1951.
Some assert that drug addiction has in fact
actually increased since the advent of modern
punitive anti-narcotics lawsY'
The only conclusion one can reach is that the
"conservative" estimate of 60,000 addicts is
probably unrealistic. Those who have dealt with
this problem, however variant their estimates may
be, have had to admit that the number of addicts
and/or narcotics users in the United States cannot
be correctly discerned. No statistics exist. Most
that are put forth are merely inferences drawn
from the number of offenders apprehended. But
who can know what percentage of all offenders
are apprehended? And how many narcotics users
are listed, when arrested, under some other crime
which they may have been caught committing?
The New York Academy of Medicine opines that
"a careful medical evaluation of those arrested
as 'thieves' would probably show that in a number
of cases they should more properly have been
classified as 'addicts.' "9
But despite uncertainty as to extent, certainty
does exist as to the fact of the present narcotics
problem. It cannot be controverted that the com-
bination of punitive laws and international controls
has not reduced the illicit narcotics trade in the
United States to negligible proportions. Therefore,
the question inexorably arises-why have these
apparently potent restraints failed to eliminate
the American narcotics problem? And, inseparably,
a second question arises-will they continue to
fail? It is the thesis of this paper that they will.
TrE DETERRENT-RESISTANT C:HARACTERISTICS Or
TIrE NARcOTIcS TRAFFIC
Profits
Profits attract, and fabulous profits exert a huge
attraction. History proves this graphically. The
10 ANSLINGER & Tomrpns, op. cit. supra note 84, at
281. This conclusion was reached by Albert Deutsch as
well. Mr. Deutsch said, "Heroin is the most frequently
used opiate among American addicts." DEUTSCH, WHAT
WE CAN Do ABOUT THE DRUG MENACE 7 (Public Af-
fairs Pamphlet No. 186, 1952). But no basis for this was
given and no indication is given as to what "most fre-
quently" would mean translated into percentages.
Most likely this conclusion is drawn from some statis-
tics compiled from studies of apprehended persons.
91 THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, REPORT
ON DRUG ADDICTIoN 5 (1955).
92 Ibid.
world has always had men who would seek gold,
explore new routes, become mercenaries, embrace
piracy, or enlist in the most hazardous adventures
where, if successful, great riches were to be had.
To be sure, not all or even many will be so at-
tracted. But some always are. And the glitter of
high prospective profits has always been able to
lure such entrepreneurs despite the dangers in-
volved. Illegality has been an ineffective bar,
even when it meant death to the apprehended.
This is true of the illegal narcotics trade.
Varying estimates of the profitability of the
narcotics trade exist. One of these, made on
February 16, 1959, is that twenty-eight and one-
half pounds of unadulterated heroin, with a whole-
sale value of S12,000, would bring in more than
$3,600,000 in the illegal market9 This means
that the final retail price represents a price 300
times the wholesale price, or 30,000 percent of
the wholesale price. Now it is true that inter-
mediaries exist between the wholesaler and the
ultimate retailer-the distributors, the peddlers
and then the pushers-but such a profit margin
allows of division without losing its fantastically
remunerative character. One reason for this high
price is that the narcotic is constantly diluted as
it passes from wholesaler, to distributor, to ped-
dler, and to pusher. Lactose is used for this adul-
teration process.
Four days after this estimate was made, on
February 20, 1959, another police raid uncovered
more heroin. This raid unearthed seventy-five and
one-half ounces of heroin which the Queens (New
York City) police valued at $500,000, or $6,622
per ounce, retail.94 This differs from the prior
estimate by approximately $1,272 per ounce, as
the retail value per ounce, if the figures of the
February 16 estimate were correct, would be about
$7,894.
A New York Police magazine reported in 1952
that a kilo (2.2 pounds) of heroin had a wholesale
price of about $3,000 outside the United States
and a final retail price, to the addict, of about
S313,500.95 This would place the retail value of
heroin, per ounce, in 1952 at about $8,906. While
this figure exceeds those more recent estimates
given above, it nonetheless represents a lesser
S-N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1959, p. 19, col. 1 (city ed.).
The estimate in this article was reported to have been
made by Inspector Edward Carey of the Narcotics
Bureau of the New York Police Department.
94 N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1959, p. 19, col. 1 (city ed.).
This estimate was not specifically ascribed to any par-
ticular source in the article.
9 NARCOTICS, U.S.A. 129 (Weston ed. 1952).
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profit margin. Here the final retail value is only
slightly over 100 times the wholesale price or
10,000 percent of it.
The figures quoted refer only to heroin, the
most profitable of the narcotics. Raw opium, at
one estimate, would bring a 6,200 percent return
on one's investment," whereas marihuana, in one
reported transaction, was to return only a little
over 400 percentY
The total annual profits realized in this country
by the illicit narcotics traffic cannot be ascertained.
But they are not needed in order to appreciate
the fact that, whatever they may actually be,
they are immense. One West Coast gang was said
by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to have made,
per year, a net figure of about $50,000,000. 98 The
New York Academy of Medicine speaks of "profits
of such enormity as to strain the imagination,"H9
and another source estimates the annual amount
of narcotics sold illicitly in New York City alone
to be valued at S100,000,000.100 Mr. Anslinger's
estimate, based on his "conservative" figure of
60,000 addicts, is that the annual amount spent
by addicts in this country for illicit narcotics is
S219,000,000.101
When profits of this magnitude are to be had,
the world will never lack for takers.
Communist China
In this day of atom and hydrogen devices, of
napalm and poison gas, and of nuclear missiles,
it should not be surprising that Communist China
has utilized the narcotics trade as an instrument
of national policy.102 The volume of this trade
directed towards the free nations of Southeast
Asia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States
has not been inconsiderable. The revenue obtained
from the sale of narcotics for 1952 has been put
at approximately $70,0 00 ,000 .1
3 The reasons for
this nefarious undertaking are thought to be
twofold: the weakening of the countries to which
the narcotics (morphine, heroin and raw opium)
are exported, and the acquisition of foreign ex-
change, especially dollars. There is a grim irony
in the fact that China, so long victimized by
9
6
1 d. at 136.
97 OURSLER & SVITH, NARCOTICS: AixERICA'S PERIL
31(1952).
91 Id. at 33.
69 NEw YORK AcADEMY, op. cit. supra note 91, at 6.100 LEONG, op. cit. supra note 88, at 24.
101 Quoted in House Subcommittee Report, op. cit.
supra note 83, at 9.102 
ANSLINGER & TOMPKINS, op. cit. supra note 84,
at 76-99.
103 Id. at 93.
foreign-imposed opium sales, should now be
utilizing the same ploy to serve communist pur-
poses.104
In terms of deterrence this is an ominous devel-
opment. Not only is a continuous supply of opiates
made available, but those who control it will not
be deterred from selling in the American market,
as others might, by any save the most startling
degree of increased effectiveness in our law enforce-
ment apparatus or by any more stringent punitive
measures. Losing manpower to our prisons cannot
be expected to deter China. They simply have too
many men and have shown themselves not to be
reluctant to lose men to gain an objective. Perhaps
even a huge drop in the price of narcotics in the
illicit American market would also fail to dis-
courage the Chinese from continuing to insinuate
narcotics into the United States if the objective
of weakening us internally is considered, apart
from the profits, a sufficient motivation -in itself.
Moreover it can be assumed that China will have
no difficulty enlisting enough agents to undertake
this work, whatever our penalties and whatever
the level of our enforcement effectiveness may be.
The death penalty has never deterred the patriot
from sabotage or espionage; neither will it or, a
fortiori, any lesser penalty deter Chinese agents
from doing their nation's bidding with regard to
smuggling, selling, and/or spreading narcotics
into the United States. And if agents cannot be
enlisted they can always be compelled.
Organization
Deterrence may be defeated by profits and
patriotism. It may also be thwarted by organiza-
tion. This fact arises because severity of punish-
ment is but one requisite for deterrence; the other
is the certainty of apprehension and subsequent
conviction. In the narcotics trade the latter factor
is weak; thus deterrence itself is weak. This is
partly due to the fact that for several reasons
narcotics are easily smuggled. First, we have
lengthy land borders with Mexico and Canada.
Second, narcotics themselves are small in size and
can be disguised and hidden in a multiplicity of
devious, ingenious ways. Third, narcotics may
come in by sea or air over many different routes,
carried by seamen or supposed tourists, despite
customs officials however diligent. Perhaps the
futility of stopping the smuggling of narcotics was
104 IMERRILL, JAPAN AND THE OPIUM MENACE (1942).
This provides a full account of how opiates were used
against the Chinese.
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most aptly described by Commissioner Anslinger
when he said,
"If you had the Army, the Navy, the Coast
Guard, the F.B.I., the Customs Service and
our (narcotics) service, you would not stop
heroin coming through the Port of New York."105
However difficult the problem would be were
these factors all that had to be contended with,
the fact is that the size and efficiency and financial
power of the chief smuggling organizations magnify
the difficulties a thousandfold. This is not only
true where a nation directs such endeavors, as
is the case with Communist China, but it is true,
too, with regard to the gangs involved. For these
are, more properly, syndicates, not gangs, with
large memberships, legitimate fronts, legal staffs,
and a hierarchy of leadership which does not
itself take part in the day-to-day operations of
the business, be it narcotics or anything else.106
Thus deterrence as embodied in punitive laws is
largely a threat only to underlings, usually of the
lowest levels at that, and not to the leadership
itself. Not only will fear of death keep those
apprehended from giving names to the police,
but as an organizational tactic few men on any
level know the names of those on the next highest
level; so ignorance even more than fear makes
tracing the leadership difficult. That very few of
the top leaders ever get caught is indicated by the
vocabulary of the addict himself which defines a
"big man" as: "the big distributor of drugs. He
is usually not an addict and he seldom goes to
jail." 1"
Thus, since the expectation of apprehension is
so small in those who organize and mastermind
the syndicates, the deterrent laws, however stern,
must correspondingly lack effectiveness. And as to
those leaders not resident in the United States,
deterrent laws can amount only to an annoyance,
requiring just enough energy to supplant the
arrested hack with a replacement.
Inadequacy of International Controls
The fact that the great bulk of illicit narcotics
in the United States comes from other nations-
either in crude or refined form-means that the
effectiveness of international controls has a great
106 Quoted in Nzw YORK ACADEmy, op. cit. supra
note 91, at 7.
106 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1959, p. 19, col. 3 (city ed.);
'OURSLER AND SMITH, NARCOTICS: AMERICA'S PERIL
(1952). The former deals with organized crime in
general while the latter concentrates on criminal groups
involved in narcotics, particularly the Mafia.
1
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influence on the effectiveness of our laws. In a
purely deterrent sense, if the dangers of appre-
hension were great throughout all steps prior to
importation into the United States, perhaps the
added risk of severe penalties in the United States
would convince at least some proportion of nar-
cotics smugglers that it just wasn't worth it. But,
as it is now, dangers prior to the United States
seem insufficient to add appreciably to the total-
ity of deterrents facing the illicit traffic. Thus our
laws alone must challenge the lure of profits; in
this uneven battle they invariably lose.
Why they should be ineffective is easy to see.
First, Communist China does not belong to the
United Nations and is a party to none of the
international conventions and protocols. On the
contrary it actively promotes the trade. Second,
the major opium producing nations have not
agreed to permit international inspection to check
on their obeisance to agreed-upon national quotas.
Third, in many countries where policing is either
purposely ineffective or necessarily inadequate,
narcotics are grown and traded in comparative
safety.Y08 A fourth difficulty is that the important
international agreements have failed to enlist all
of the nations which produce opiates, marihuana,
and/or cocaine.) 9 A fifth reason is, assuming
arguendo that all governments sincerely wished to
stop illicit cultivation, production, and smuggling
of narcotics within their borders, the natural,
inherent difficulties involved-given the high
degree of organization and wealth possessed by
these synicates-would pose tremendous obstacles.
These obstacles grow larger as the number- of
synthetic narcotics increases, and as the proba-
bility increases that syndicates may eventually
make their own. Of the sixty narcotics now under
supposed United Nations control, thirty-five or 58.3
percent are synthetics.n0
The Nature of Addiction"'
1. Dependence and Withdrawal
Deterrence presupposes rationality. It proceeds
100 N.Y. Times, March 6, 1959, p. 34, col. 7. This
describes the situation today in interior Thailand where
natives make opium contrary to Thai law but with
considerable impunity.
"9 For the nations alluded to, see text, supra under
heading, "International Controls."
110 U.N. Doc. No. E/CN. 7/335/ add. 4 (1958).
M Addiction and addict are used in the remainder of
this paper to refer only to those users of an opiate who
have reached the point of psychological dependence
upon regular dosages and have also become physically
dependent upon such dosages so that, if dosages are not
received, they suffer from withdrawal. "Withdrawal"
is defined in this section of the text.
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on the assumption that the detriments which
would inure to the prospective criminal upon
apprehension can be made severe enough to dis-
suade him from undertaking the criminal act
on the ground that the rewards of the crime will
not outweigh the probability of having to suffer
those detriments. But such a weighing process
requires thought by those against whom the
deterrent penalty is aimed. The clearest case is
insanity. No legal deterrent can regulate the con-
duct of one who is bereft of reason, because he
will be oblivious to such deterrent. The opiate
addict, in the same way, cannot be deterred from
seeking his drug, and it is this one fact, more than
anything else, which must necessarily frustrate
the capacity of the criminal law to erase the
illicit narcotics market. For it is the nature of
the addict that his accustomed dosages, and per-
haps steadily increasing amounts of them, are
absolutely essential for his physical well-being.
His body actually depends upon these dosages
for normal functioning. He thus is a regular,
guaranteed, thoroughly entrapped customer who
will pay any price to get what he must have. He
provides a captive market which gives the illicit
narcotics trade a security unknown in most any
other type of business-legal or illegal.
Since the nature of addiction must be compre-
hended to understand why laws, no matter how
stringent, cannot deter the addict, it is profitable
to examine the nature of what all addicts fear
possibly above death-the abstinence syndrome,
known popularly as withdrawal.
Withdrawal refers not to the act of withdrawing
from the addict the dosages he has become used
to, or the fact that such dosages have become
unavailable when needed, for whatever reason;
rather, withdrawal refers to the physical and
mental reactions that the addict suffers when
such dosages are due, but not available.
Erich Hesse, speaking of physical dependence
and the phenomenon of withdrawal, describes
them thusly:
"When the organism is deprived of the alkaloid,
it immediately reacts by producing abstinence
symptoms. States of exaltation, manic fits,
cramps and serious circulatory disturbances
endanger the life of the addict . . . Voluntary
escape from the clutches of the poison (mor-
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A more lengthy and graphic portrayal of with-
drawal is presented by Dr. de Ropp:
"Withdrawal sickness .... is a shattering ex-
perience and even a physician ... finds it an
ordeal to watch the agonies of patients in this
condition. The addict begins to grow uneasy
about twelve hours after the last dose of mor-
phine or heroin .... he yawns, shivers, and
sweats... discharge pours from the eyes...
watery mucus pours from the nose ... the hair
on the skin stands up and the skin itself is
cold... his bowels begin to act with fantastic
violence ... causing explosive vomiting .... The
abdominal pain is severe and rapidly increases
... thirty-six hours after his last dose of the
drug the addict presents a truly dreadful
spectacle... his weakness may become so great
that he literally cannot raise his head."''u
It is this fact-the dreadful nature of with-
drawal-that "drives the user irresistably to any
lengths to obtain a supply. In desperation even
suicide may be resorted to as a way out."" 4 Added
to this is the fact that withdrawal, however
advanced, may be relieved by simply taking
the opiate dosage the absence of which was the
cause of withdrawal. Dr. Harris Isbell, Director
of the Addiction Research Center, Public Health
Service Hospital, Lexington, Kentucky, has
written:
"It is a dramatic experience to observe a miser-
ably ill person receive an intravenous injection
of morphine, and to see him thirty minutes
later shaved, clean, laughing and joking.""
5
Thus the addict craves his opiate both to prevent
withdrawal and to stop it. And the craving is so
great that the addict invariably "becomes deter-
mined to get the drug without counting the risk."" 6
Being in such a non-rational state, the law cannot
deter him.
7
2. The absence of a cure"8
It is not correct to say that drug addiction is
113 DE Ropp, DRUGS AND THE ML1m 152-54 (1957).
14 LNmEsmTHI, OPIATE ADDIcTIoN 55 (1947).
115 Quoted in DE Rop, op. cit. supra note 113, at 153.
"
6 NEw YoRK AcADEmY, op. cit. surpa note 91, at 7.
117This conclusion is shared also by Dr. Herbert
Barger, Consultant to the U.S. Public Health Service.
His views are presented in: Hotchner, This Bold New
Plan Can Smash the Dope Menace, This Week Magazine
12 (Sept. 14, 1958).
11 Two basic types of treatment are employed to
relieve the addict of physical dependence upon an
opiate-abrupt withdrawal and gradual withdrawal.
These two methods are described in detail in Note, The
Treatment of Drug Addiction at the Correctional Hospi-
tals in New York City, 13 J. CRms. L. & C. 122-26
(1922).
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"incurable." Commentators vary as to the per-
centage of curables among the addict population,
and most seem to agree that, out of every hundred
treated, at least a few may remain permanently
away from opiates. In this area of the narcotics
field, as in most others, controversy abounds.
On the one hand, it is claimed that roughly 25
percent of all those treated are in fact cured;
Commissioner Anslinger, in a rather ambiguous
passage, cites statistics which show that of 18,000
addicts treated at the Lexington Hospital, 64
percent never returned for treatment whereas the
other 36 percent did. He does not expressly claim
that failure to return to Lexington either con-
clusively or presumptively implies permanent cure,
yet he fails to examine further this 64 percent and
refers to these figures as proof that the addict can
be rehabilitated. Clearly this figure of 64 percent
is of very minimal value; many reasons could
exist for ex-patients of Lexington to relapse and
still not go back to Lexington. Also, many addicts
could in fact have gone back after the period
examined by Commissioner Anslinger was over,
i.e., after 1952.119 The worthlessness of Com-
missioner Anslinger's figures can be appreciated
even more clearly by viewing them in the light of
the admission of Dr. Kenneth W. Chapman,
Assistant Chief of the Public Health Service, that
only fifteen percent of the patients treated at the
federal narcotics hospitals have been permanently
cured.
12 0
The contrary, or "cynical" view as Commis-
sioner Anslinger would term it, is that only about
two percent of all treated addicts can be per-
manently cured. 12' Dr. Herbert Barger would say
that "perhaps" this figure is as high as three
percent with this percentage the implied ceiling. 20
Professor Lindesmith is probably the most pessi-
mistic as to the incidence of genuine, permanent
cures. He refers to a study of about 800 German
addicts made by Dansauer and Rieth in which
81.6% of the "cures" relapsed within a year; after
the third year had elapsed, 93.9% had relapsed,
and, after five years 96.7% had relapsed. As to the
9 
ANSLIN[GER & TO MPKINS, THE; TRAFFIc IN NAR-
coTics 241 (1953). The authors do not identify the
source of the estimate of 25% cures or the studies
behind it.
120 NARcoTics, U.S.A. 112 (Weston ed. 1952).
121 ANSLINGER & TOMPKINS, op. cit. supra note 118,
at 241. Again the proponents of and basis for this view
are not presented.
1
2 Hotchner, This Bold New Plan Can Smash the
Dope Menace, This Week Magazine 12 (Sept. 14, 1958).
3.3% left, no assurance existed that they also did
not eventually relapse. 23
The argot of the addict once again is helpful.
The phrase "once a junker, always a junker" shows
the addicts' views on the inevitability of relapse
after treatment.iU Moreover, the argot also con-
tains the word "kick-back" which means "the
addict's relapse into his habit after a period of
abstinence. "i25
The reasons for this propensity to relapse,
though essentially unknown, are loosely referred
to as psychological; were the physiological de-
pendence the crucial factor no problem would exist
as, properly treated, withdrawal can be relatively
easy and, once the recovery from withdrawal is
completed, the physical dependence is at an end.
But unfortunately it is not that simple. For the
mind has not altered, and those dark influences
which caused the initial addiction-whether psy-
chological or environmental or an amalgam of
both-still exist. Because withdrawal cannot extri-
cate from the addict these scarcely-comprehended
forces, the cure is little more than an abnormal
interim, a respite between periods of active, all-
engrossing addiction. Professor Lindesmith sug-
gests that knowledge is the sine qua non of ad-
diction, that addiction cannot exist until the opiate
user has undergone withdrawal, felt its distresses,
used opiates in alleviation and has understood
precisely what has happened to him. Without this
knowledge no addiction could take root in the
mind, for the remedial properties of the opiate
would not have been impressed upon the addict.
But once he knows the nature of withdrawal and
knows that the opiate, and only the opiate, can
either relieve or prevent it, then the dependence
upon the opiate becomes so embedded that it will
exert an irresistable longing for opiates which will
persist even after treatment has cured physical
dependence. And science knows of no practicable
way of purging the mind of these destructive re-
membrancesY.
6
But whatever theory of addiction is adopted,
and whatever percentage of addicts are deemed
curable between zero and 25, the conclusion seems
inescapable that neither forced nor voluntary
cures are a solution. Laws which seek to accomplish
such cures will fail as deterrents, for they will, at
1
2 
LINDESMITH, op. cit. supra note 114, at 49.
12
4 Id. at 47. "Junker", of course, means addict.
12
5 Lindesmith, The Argot of the Underworld Drug
Addict, 29 J. CRIm. L., & C. 271 (1938).
126 LiNDEsmiTr, op. cit. supra note 114.
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best, encounter three recidivists out of every four
addicts they treat.
It is therefore believed that, due to the fantastic
profits, the role of Communist China, the high
degree of organization possessed by the narcotics
syndicates, the inadequacy of international con-
trols, and the very nature of addiction itself, the
present federal and state laws, or any others sired
by the punitive approach, lack the ability to
abolish the illegal narcotics traffic or reduce it to
negligible proportions.
Assuming this, it becomes unnecessary to ex-
amine charges that the punitive federal and state
legislation has in fact increased the illegal narcotics
traffic That it cannot eradicate it or lessen it
sufficiently is reason enough to seek another
approach, one not placing primary reliance upon
the deterrent capabilities of penal laws. The details
of this approach raise questions beyond the ken of
the legal discipline.' Indeed, it is so complex that
no one discipline can deal with it in all its aspects.
A comprehensive attack on the problem must
include thie knowledge of the doctor, bio-chemist,
psychologist, pharmacologist, sociologist, lawyer,
legislator, United Nations specialist, and educator.
For this reason this paper will not presume to
choose among the various socio-medical plans
suggested or actually in use,N but will instead
127 These arguments usually claim that such laws, by
making narcotics illegal, have forced a rise in the price
of narcotics and have thus caused addicts to beget
other addicts as customers in order to earn the needed
money. Another argument is that making narcotics
unlawful makes them more alluring to the curi-
ous and the adventurous. Such arguments cannot
be weighed; for each proponent an opponent exists and
neither has any definite statistics or completely persua-
sive logic to sustain his position. No one can show that,
even if addicts do generally try to convert others into
addicts-an assumption which is itself controverted-
the present number of addicts exceeds the number that
would have existed had anti-narcotics legislation never
been passed. And no one can show that illegality has
clothed narcotics with more allure than stigma.
u28 Some of the plans suggested are:
1. Utilize narcotic clinics at which addicts could
obtain controlled, medically determined, low cost
dosages. Stevens, Make Dope Legal, Harper's Magazine
40-47 (Nov. 1952); Hotchner, This Bold New Plan Can
Smash the Dope Menace, This Week Magazine 11-13
(Sept. 14, 1958); NARCOTICS, U.S.A. 242 (Weston ed.
1952); NEW YORK ACADEnY Or MEDICINE, REPORT ON
DRUG ADDICTION 14 (1955).
2. Allow physicians to prescribe for addicts as in any
other case of disease. LINDESMITH, OPIATE ADDICTION
205 (1947). This is the practice in England under certain
circumstances. The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1951, 14 &
15 GEo. VI, c. 48; BR. INFO. Svc. RELEASE, THE
CONTROL Or DANGEROUS DRUGS IN GREAT BRITAIN
(1957). Favorable evaluations of this practice may be
merely assume that one of them, or some combi-
nation of them, is the logical alternative to the
punitive approach. No third alternative seems to
exist.
It is the second thesis of this paper that the
criminal law may well have an important role to
play in whatever type of plan is used, even though
presumably this plan would follow a socio-medical
approach.
POSITIVE USE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AS A
DETERRENT
Marihuana and Cocaine
The present federal and state laws do not, in the
main, differentiate between the use of opiates, on
the one hand, and cocaine and marihuana on the
other.ln Yet definite, maybe crucial, differences
exist.
1. Marihuana and cocaine are stimulants
whereas opiates are depressants. Cocaine causes
restlessness and excitement, tends to convey
found in The Times (London), July 15, 1957, p. 11, last
col. and ibid., April 16, 1958, p. 11, last col.
The "clinic" plans vary as to the role of federal
agencies and other details. Most plans stress the need
for increased research and psychotherapeutic follow-up
treatment after the "cure" to fight recidivism. All
seem to agree that addicts must be able to get the
drugs they require legally. There is division as to the
role of education.
Though such plans are assumed herein to be the
logical alternatives to the punitive approach, it is not
true that all medical authorities favor these plans.
Among those who have voiced opposition to these
types of plans are Dr. James V. Lowery, former Medical
Director of the Public Health Hospital, at Lexington;
Dr. Harris Isbell, Director of the Addiction Research
Center at Lexington; and Dr. Robert H. Felix, Director,
National Institute of Mental Health. Anslinger,
Narcotic Addiction as Seen by the Law-Enforcement
Officer, 21 Fed. Prob., 34 (No. 2 1957); Hotchner, This
Bold New Plan Can Smash the Dope Menace, This Week
Magazine (Sept. 14, 1958). Arguments exist also as to
why the clinics opened shortly after the end of World
War I failed-because. of inherent, uneradicable faults
or because of operational difficulties which could be
corrected. Only a full study could resolve these argu-
ments.
129 The Narcotic Control Act of 1956 is entitled "Vio-
lation of law relating to opium and coca leaves and
marihuana." No differentiation is shown between of-
fenses concerning opiates and marihuana-cocaine.
INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, §7237a. The Uniform Narcotic
Act is similar. "Narcotic Drugs" are defined therein as
"coca leaves, opium, and cannabis, and every other
substance neither chemically nor physically distin-
distinguishable from them." This is contained in §1
(14). Moreover the prohibitory sections of the act speak
in terms of "narcotic drugs" as though they were




feelings of great physical and mental power, in-
duces delusions and persecution complexes, and
"may make a man dangerous" as the cocainist
"under the influence of his delusions is quite
capable of using it (a weapon)."' 30 Marihuana,
which has aroused violent debate as to its danger-
ousness, 31 nonetheless does tend to cause nervous
excitement, hallucinations, distortions of time
and space relationships and, of greater danger,
marihuana tends to release inhibitions and thus let
loose a psychotic personality upon society if the
psychotic potential existed in the particular person
prior to taking marihuana. Persons already un-
balanced may be rendered temporarily insane by
using marihuana."'
The opiates, however, are not stimulants. They
are depressants, and they induce euphoria. The
popular image of the violent "dope fiend" is an
utterly inaccurate picture of the person addicted
to opiates, especially while under the influence of
his dosage. Instead of creating an abnormal state,
the opiate dosage preserves the addict in normalcy.
The dosage's function is to prevent withdrawal
distress; the exhilaration is one of relief and re-
laxation and contentment, not one of superhuman
moods, delusions, or psychotic impulses.'
3'
2. Marihuana and cocaine are not addictive,
whereas opiates are.' 4 Under no circumstances can
true addiction result from using marihuana and
cocaine as it does from using opiates. The terrible
ordeal of withdrawal is peculiar to the opiates and
does not result when dosages of cocaine and
marihuana are ceased. Thus the user of cocaine and
marihuana may indeed become fond of and used to
such dosages; but in never becoming as addict he
never reaches the point at which he becomes
thoroughly irrational and immune to deterrent
legislation. He does not have to have his dosage.
Thus, not only do the effects of cocaine and
marihuana make deterring the use of these im-
perative, but there seems reason to believe de-
terrent legislation may be able to reduce the
problem of illicit cocaine and marihuana use to
1O DE ROPP, DRUGS AND THE MiND 64 (1957).
11Id. at 100-114.
3
2Id. at 61-114. Illustrations of homicidal and
suicidal effects of marihuana, as well as of hallucina-
tions, delusions and brutality caused thereby, are found
in ANSLiNGER & To-P'iuNs, THE TRAP'ic IN NARcoT-
ics 22-25 (1953).
1m Sandoz, Report on Morphinism to the Municipal
Court of Boston, 13 J. Catz. L. & C. 13 (1922).
134 Sandoz, op. cit. supra note 133, at 12; DE Ropp, op.
cit. supra note 130, at 78, 79; LinDEsmrir, op. cit. supra
note 114, at 6.
negligible proportions and that such plans as those
listed in footnote 128, above, should not attempt to
deal with it. For here the market security available
to the illicit trade in opiates does not exist, as no
addicts exist. This means the user cannot be
counted on to persevere in his dosages unmindful -
of rising prices or severer penalties. Of course, the
other obstacles to stopping the illicit trade will still
exist, but it may just be that, without profit
security, those obstacles will fall away. The inter-
national trade in illicit cocaine is steadily di-
minishing, 13 5 and it is known that the coca leaf, as
opposed to the opium poppy and the cannabis
plant, grows primarily in but two countries-Peru
and Bolivia-thus making the control problem
much easier. Moreover Communist China does not
figure in the cocaine traffic.
As to marihuana, it presents great supply
problems inasmuch the cannabis plant grows in
much of the world, including the United States.
However, its profit margin is well below that of
the opiates, at approximately 400 percent, and
once again Communist China is not a factor. It
seems quite possible that if time and attention
now directed towards the much greater illicit
opium problems were able to be diverted to the
illicit marihuana trade, upon implementation of
some form of opiate dispensation plan for addicts,
that trade could be greatly reduced. Unlike the
opiate addicts the marihuana users could not be
expected to remain uncomplaining customers when
increasing law enforcement raised the price of
marihuana, the probability of apprehension and
perhaps even the severity of the penalties. This is
true of cocainists as well.
Opiate Traders"16 and Non-Addicted Users
1. Opiate Traders. Non-addicted persons who
traffic in illegal opiates should be subject to the
full vigor of punitive legislation. Not themselves
addicted, they have the free will required for the
success of deterrent laws. Such laws by themselves
will probably not dissuade the opiate trader from
continuing his trade so long as the profit remains
high, or he is serving his country, or other factors
reduce the probability of apprehension. Nonethe-
less if the profits lessen with the advent of some
plan seeking to administer opiate dosages to the
' U.N. Doc. No. ST/DPT/SER. A/80, p. 17 (19581.
136 "Opiate traders" are used herein to include all
non-addicted persons who smuggle, distribute, process.
sell, or manufacture illegal opiates.
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addict medically, the presence of severe punitive
legislation will be a powerful added reason for
leaving the business. At some point the profits
become too low to be worth it. The criminal law
can help make this point appear sooner.
2. Non-Addicled Users. Like the opiate traders,
one who uses opiates but has not yet reached ad-
diction retains his freedom of will. Until addiction
he is amenable to deterrence. Until addiction he
ranks with the cocaine and marihuana users and
should be so regarded by the law. Though not
dangerous in the truly criminal sense because he
is free of the terrors of withdrawal before his
dosage and eurphoria after it, the non-addict user
nonetheless threatens society because he may at
any time become an addict and because, even
though not yet an addict, he supports the illegal
trade. The fact of addiction may be ascertained
medically, thus the addict and the user are dis-
tinguishable for purposes of punishment. This is
done by medical, psychiatric and chemical exami-
nationsr It can also be done simply by seeing if
withdrawal distress occurs. No non-addict user
could simulate withdrawal.
Of course any rejoinder that this would en-
courage users to become addicts must be rejected
as ridiculous. A user may seek opiates but he
never seeks addiction to opiates. It is precisely the
unfounded feeling that he will not become an
addict that keeps the opiate user dabbling in
opiates. No one dreads and hates addiction so
much as the addict himself, and the more one
knows about addiction the less one desires it. It
must be borne in mind that opiate addiction is a
constant battle to feel normal, not a period of self-
regulated ecstasy. The opiate dosages serve only to
protect the addict's normality against the ravages
of withdrawal; they do not induce a pleasurable
state except as normality is deemed pleasurable.
The desire for an exotic experience, which might
inspire the user of cocaine and marihuana, would
not exist as an inducement to further use of or
eventual addiction to opiates, though it is true
that initial dosages often do afford a pleasurable
relief from anxieties. This. however, ceases with
use.
117 NARCOTICS, U.S.A. 235 (Weston ed. 1952).
None of this is meant to imply that the user of
marihuana and cocaine, or the non-addict user of
opiates, may not have a strong desire for his
narcotic that cannot be easily deterred. Cigarettes,
for instance, are not addicting, yet many have
fruitlessly sought to give them up. But desire is
not craving and, while the one may be controlled
by fear of punishment, at least in most cases and
to some extent, the other is oblivious to threats.
Thus the criminal law ma- attack the first but it
is powerless against the second.'-,
CONCLUSION
Because of the huge profits, the political moti-
vations of Communist China, the inadequacy of
international controls, the high degree of organi-
zation and wealth characteristic of the inter-
national narcotics syndicates, and the nature of
opiate addiction, it is believed that federal and
state punitive legislation is incapable of abolishing
the illicit narcotics trade or of reducing it to negli-
gible proportions. Since the present legislation is,
except in the state of New Hampshire, deemed
adequate by champions of the punitive approach,
if it is doomed to failure for the above reasons,
clearly a new approach is needed. Though choosing
and describing this new approach is properly a
task for a battery of experts representing several
disciplines, nonetheless it will presumably involve
some form of legal dispensation of opiates to
addicts. It seems probable, nevertheless, that this
new approach could be profitably complemented
by punitive legislation which seeks to deter the
illicit use, possession, sales, distribution, manu-
facture, and processing of cocaine and marihuana,
as well as all non-addicts who traffic in or use
illicit opiates.
138This paper takes no position on the feasibility of
punishing addicts who, though legal opiate dispensaries
have been set up or private physicians have been
empowered to prescribe for addiction, still continue to
get their opiates through illegal channels or deal in
opiates to raise the money therefor. Also not covered is
the problem of what to do about addicts who accept
clinical or physicians' care but who, in doing so, some-
how violate the law. These questions can be decided
only as part of a comprehensive, detailed plan aimed
at destroying addiction.
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